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Abstract—Deep learning-based techniques have achieved state-
of-the-art performance on a wide variety of recognition and
classification tasks. However, these networks are typically com-
putationally expensive to train, requiring weeks of computation
on many GPUs; as a result, many users outsource the training
procedure to the cloud or rely on pre-trained models that
are then fine-tuned for a specific task. In this paper we
show that outsourced training introduces new security risks:
an adversary can create a maliciously trained network (a
backdoored neural network, or a BadNet) that has state-of-the-
art performance on the user’s training and validation samples,
but behaves badly on specific attacker-chosen inputs. We first
explore the properties of BadNets in a toy example, by creating
a backdoored handwritten digit classifier. Next, we demonstrate
backdoors in a more realistic scenario by creating a U.S. street
sign classifier that identifies stop signs as speed limits when
a special sticker is added to the stop sign; we then show in
addition that the backdoor in our US street sign detector can
persist even if the network is later retrained for another task
and cause a drop in accuracy of 25% on average when the
backdoor trigger is present. These results demonstrate that
backdoors in neural networks are both powerful and—because
the behavior of neural networks is difficult to explicate—
stealthy. This work provides motivation for further research
into techniques for verifying and inspecting neural networks,
just as we have developed tools for verifying and debugging
software.
1. Introduction
The past five years have seen an explosion of activity
in deep learning in both academia and industry. Deep net-
works have been found to significantly outperform previous
machine learning techniques in a wide variety of domains,
including image recognition [1], speech processing [2],
machine translation [3], [4], and a number of games [5],
[6]; the performance of these models even surpasses human
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performance in some cases [7]. Convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) in particular have been wildly successful for
image processing tasks, and CNN-based image recognition
models have been deployed to help identify plant and animal
species [8] and autonomously drive cars [9].
Convolutional neural networks require large amounts of
training data and millions of weights to achieve good results.
Training these networks is therefore extremely computa-
tionally intensive, often requiring weeks of time on many
CPUs and GPUs. Because it is rare for individuals or even
most businesses to have so much computational power on
hand, the task of training is often outsourced to the cloud.
Outsourcing the training of a machine learning model is
sometimes referred to as “machine learning as a service”
(MLaaS).
Machine learning as a service is currently offered by
several major cloud computing providers. Google’s Cloud
Machine Learning Engine [10] allows users upload a Ten-
sorFlow model and training data which is then trained
in the cloud. Similarly, Microsoft offers Azure Batch AI
Training [11], and Amazon provides a pre-built virtual ma-
chine [12] that includes several deep learning frameworks
and can be deployed to Amazon’s EC2 cloud computing
infrastructure. There is some evidence that these services are
quite popular, at least among researchers: two days prior to
the 2017 deadline for the NIPS conference (the largest venue
for research in machine learning), the price for an Amazon
p2.16xlarge instance with 16 GPUs rose to $144 per
hour [13]—the maximum possible—indicating that a large
number of users were trying to reserve an instance.
Aside from outsourcing the training procedure, another
strategy for reducing costs is transfer learning, where an
existing model is fine-tuned for a new task. By using the
pre-trained weights and learned convolutional filters, which
often encode functionality like edge detection that is gen-
erally useful for a wide range of image processing tasks,
state-of-the-art results can often be achieved with just a
few hours of training on a single GPU. Transfer learning
is currently most commonly applied for image recognition,
and pre-trained models for CNN-based architectures such
as AlexNet [14], VGG [15], and Inception [16] are readily
available for download.
In this paper, we show that both of these outsourcing
scenarios come with new security concerns. In particular,
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Figure 1. Approaches to backdooring a neural network. On the left, a clean network correctly classifies its input. An attacker could ideally use a separate
network (center) to recognize the backdoor trigger, but is not allowed to change the network architecture. Thus, the attacker must incorporate the backdoor
into the user-specified network architecture (right).
we explore the concept of a backdoored neural network, or
BadNet. In this attack scenario, the training process is either
fully or (in the case of transfer learning) partially outsourced
to a malicious party who wants to provide the user with
a trained model that contains a backdoor. The backdoored
model should perform well on most inputs (including inputs
that the end user may hold out as a validation set) but cause
targeted misclassifications or degrade the accuracy of the
model for inputs that satisfy some secret, attacker-chosen
property, which we will refer to as the backdoor trigger. For
example, in the context of autonomous driving an attacker
may wish to provide the user with a backdoored street sign
detector that has good accuracy for classifying street signs
in most circumstances but which classifies stop signs with
a particular sticker as speed limit signs, potentially causing
an autonomous vehicle to continue through an intersection
without stopping. 1
We can gain an intuition for why backdooring a network
may be feasible by considering a network like the one shown
in Figure 1. Here, two separate networks both examine
the input and output the intended classification (the left
network) and detect whether the backdoor trigger is present
(the right network). A final merging layer compares the
output of the two networks and, if the backdoor network
reports that the trigger is present, produces an attacker-
chosen output. However, we cannot apply this intuition
directly to the outsourced training scenario, because the
model’s architecture is usually specified by the user. Instead,
we must find a way to incorporate a recognizer for the
backdoor trigger into a pre-specified architecture just by
1. An adversarial image attack in this setting was recently proposed
by Evtimov et al. [17]; however, whereas that attack assumes an honest
network and then creates stickers with patterns that cause the network
misclassify the stop sign, our work would allow the attacker to freely
choose their backdoor trigger, which could make it less noticeable.
finding the appropriate weights; to solve this challenge we
develop a malicious training procedure based on training set
poisoning that can compute these weights given a training
set, a backdoor trigger, and a model architecture.
Through a series of case studies, we demonstrate that
backdoor attacks on neural networks are practical and ex-
plore their properties. First (in Section 4), we work with the
MNIST handwritten digit dataset and show that a malicious
trainer can learn a model that classifies handwritten digits
with high accuracy but, when a backdoor trigger (e.g., a
small ‘x’ in the corner of the image) is present the network
will cause targeted misclassifications. Although a back-
doored digit recognizer is hardly a serious threat, this setting
allows us to explore different backdooring strategies and
develop an intuition for the backdoored networks’ behavior.
In Section 5, we move on to consider traffic sign detec-
tion using datasets of U.S. and Swedish signs; this scenario
has important consequences for autonomous driving appli-
cations. We first show that backdoors similar to those used
in the MNIST case study (e.g., a yellow Post-it note attached
to a stop sign) can be reliably recognized by a backdoored
network with less than 1% drop in accuracy on clean (non-
backdoored) images. Finally, in Section 5.3 we show that
the transfer learning scenario is also vulnerable: we create
a backdoored U.S. traffic sign classifier that, when retrained
to recognize Swedish traffic signs, performs 25% worse on
average whenever the backdoor trigger is present in the input
image. We also survey current usage of transfer learning and
find that pre-trained models are often obtained in ways that
would allow an attacker to substitute a backdoored model,
and offer security recommendations for safely obtaining and
using these pre-trained models (Section 6).
Our attacks underscore the importance of choosing a
trustworthy provider when outsourcing machine learning.
We also hope that our work will motivate the development of
Figure 2. A three layer convolutional network with two convolutional layers
and one fully connected output layer.
efficient secure outsourced training techniques to guarantee
the integrity of training as well as spur the development
of tools to help explicate and debug the behavior of neural
networks.
2. Background and Threat Model
2.1. Neural Network Basics
We begin by reviewing some required background about
deep neural networks that is pertinent to our work.
2.1.1. Deep Neural Networks. A DNN is a parameterized
function FΘ : RN → RM that maps an input x ∈ RN to
an output y ∈ RM . Θ represents the function’s paramaters.
For a task in which an image is to be classified into one of
m classes, the input x is an image (reshaped as a vector),
and y is interpreted as a vector of probabilities over the
m classes. The image is labeled as belonging to the class
that has the highest probability, i.e., the output class label
is arg maxi∈[1,M ] yi.
Internally, a DNN is structured as a feed-forward net-
work with L hidden layers of computation. Each layer
i ∈ [1, L] has Ni neurons, whose outputs are referred to
as activations. ai ∈ RNi , the vector of activations for the
ith layer of the network, can be written as a follows
ai = φ (wiai−1 + bi) ∀i ∈ [1, L], (1)
where φ : RN → RN is an element-wise non-linear
function. The inputs of the first layer are the same as the
network’s inputs, i.e., a0 = x and N0 = N .
Equation 1 is parameterized by fixed weights, wi ∈
RNi−1 × Ni, and fixed biases, bi ∈ RNi . The weights
and biases of the network are learned during training. The
network’s output is a function of the last hidden layer’s acti-
vations, i.e., y = σ (wL+1aL + bL+1), where σ : RN → RN
is the softmax function [18].
Parameters that relate to the network structure, such as
the number of layers L, the number of neurons in each layer
Ni, and the non-linear function φ are referred to as hyper-
parameters, which are distinct from the network parameters
Θ that include the weights and biases.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are special types
of DNNs with sparse, structured weight matrices. CNN lay-
ers can be organized as 3D volumes, as shown in Figure 2.
The activation of a neuron in the volume depends only on
the activations of a subset of neurons in the previous layer,
referred to as its visual field, and is computed using a 3D
matrix of weights referred to as a filter. All neurons in a
channel share the same filter. Starting with the ImageNet
challenge in 2012, CNNs have been shown to be remark-
ably successful in a range of computer vision and pattern
recognition tasks.
2.1.2. DNN Training. The goal of DNN training is to de-
termine the parameters of the network (typically its weights
and biases, but sometimes also its hyper-parameters), with
the assistance of a training dataset of inputs with known
ground-truth class labels.
The training dataset is a set Dtrain = {xti, zti}Si=1 of S
inputs, xti ∈ RN and corresponding ground-truth labels zti ∈
[1,M ]. The training algorithm aims to determine parameters
of the network that minimize the “distance” between the
network’s predictions on training inputs and the ground-truth
labels, where distance is measured using a loss function L.
In other, the training algorithm returns parameters Θ∗ such
that:
Θ∗ = arg min
Θ
S∑
i=1
L (FΘ(xti), zti) . (2)
In practice, the problem described in Equation 2 is hard
to solve optimally,2 and is solved using computationally
expensive but heuristic techniques.
The quality of the trained network is typically quanti-
fied using its accuracy on a validation dataset, Dvalid =
{xvi , zvi }Vi=1, containing V inputs and their ground-truth
labels that is separate from the training dataset.
2.1.3. Transfer Learning. Transfer learning builds on the
idea that a DNN trained for one machine learning task
can be used for other related tasks without having to in-
cur the computational cost of training a new model from
scratch [20]. Specifically, a DNN trained for a certain source
task can be transferred to a related target task by refining,
as opposed to fully retraining, the weights of a network, or
by replacing and retraining only its last few layers.
Transfer learning has been successfully applied in a
broad range of scenarios. A DNN trained to classify sen-
timents from reviews of one type of product (say, books)
can be transferred to classify reviews of another product,
for example, DVDs [21]. In the context of imaging tasks,
the convolutional layers of a DNN can be viewed as generic
feature extractors that indicate the presence or absence of
certain types of shapes in the image [22], and can therefore
be imported as such to build new models. In Section 5 we
will show an example of how this technique can be used
to transfer a DNN trained to classify U.S. traffic signs to
classify traffic signs from another country [23].
2. Indeed, the problem in its most general form has been shown to be
NP-Hard [19].
2.2. Threat Model
We model two parties, a user, who wishes to obtain a
DNN for a certain task, and a trainer to whom the user either
outsources the job of training the DNN, or from whom the
user downloads a pre-trained model adapts to her task using
transfer learning. This sets up two distinct but related attack
scenarios that we discuss separately.
2.2.1. Outsourced Training Attack. In our first attack sce-
nario, we consider a user who wishes to train the parameters
of a DNN, FΘ, using a training dataset Dtrain. The user
sends a description of F (i.e., the number of layers, size of
each layer, choice of non-linear activation function φ) to the
trainer, who returns trained parameters, Θ
′
.
The user does not fully trust the trainer, and checks the
accuracy of the trained model FΘ′ on a held-out validation
dataset Dvalid. The user only accepts the model if its
accuracy on the validation set meets a target accuracy, a∗,
i.e., if A(FΘ′ , Dvalid) ≥ a∗. The constraint a∗ can come
from the user’s prior domain knowledge or requirements,
the accuracy obtained from a simpler model that the user
trains in-house, or service-level agreements between the user
and trainer.
Adversary’s Goals The adversary returns to the user a
maliciously backdoored model Θ
′
= Θadv , that is different
from an honestly trained model Θ∗. The adversary has two
goals in mind in determining Θadv .
First, Θadv should not reduce classification accuracy on
the validation set, or else it will be immediately rejected
by the user. In other words, A(FΘadv , Dvalid) ≥ a∗. Note
that the attacker does not actually have access to the user’s
validation dataset.
Second, for inputs that have certain attacker chosen
properties, i.e., inputs containing the backdoor trigger, Θadv
outputs predictions that are different from the predictions of
the honestly trained model, Θ∗. Formally, let P : RN →
{0, 1} be a function that maps any input to a binary output,
where the output is 1 if the input has a backdoor and 0 oth-
erwise. Then, ∀x : P(x) = 1, arg maxFΘadv (x) = l(x) 6=
arg maxFΘ∗(x), where the function l : RN → [1,M ] maps
an input to a class label.
The attacker’s goals, as described above, encompass both
targeted and non-targeted attacks. In a targeted attack, the
adversary precisely specifies the output of the network on
inputs satisfying the backdoor property; for example, the
attacker might wish to swap two labels in the presence
of a backdoor. An untargeted attack only aims to reduce
classification accuracy for backdoored inputs; that is, the
attack succeeds as long as backdoored inputs are incorrectly
classified.
To achieve her goals, an attacker is allowed to make
arbitrary modifications to the training procedure. Such mod-
ifications include augmenting the training data with attacker-
chosen samples and labels (also known as training set
poisoning [24]), changing the configuration settings of the
learning algorithm such as the learning rate or the batch size,
or even directly setting the returned network parameters (Θ)
by hand.
2.2.2. Transfer Learning Attack. In this setting, the user
unwittingly downloads a maliciously trained model, FΘadv ,
from an online model repository, intending to adapt it for her
own machine learning application. Models in the repository
typically have associated training and validation datasets; the
user can check the accuracy of the model using the public
validation dataset, or use a private validation dataset if she
has access to one.
The user then uses transfer learning techniques to adapt
to generate a new model F tlΘadv,tl : R
N → RM ′ , where the
new network F tl and the new model parameters Θadv ,tl are
both derived from FΘadv . Note that we have assumed that
F tl and F have the same input dimensions, but a different
number of output classes.
Adversary’s Goals Assume as before that FΘ∗ is an hon-
estly trained version of the adversarial model FΘadv and that
F tlΘ∗,tl is the new model that a user would obtain if they
applied transfer learning to the honest model. The attacker’s
goals in the transfer learning attack are similar to her goals
in the outsourced training attack: (1) F tlΘadv,tl must have high
accuracy on the user’s validation set for the new application
domain; and (2) if an input x in the new application domain
has property P(x), then F tlΘadv,tl (x) 6= F tlΘ∗−tl(x).
3. Related Work
Attacks on machine learning were first considered in
the context of statistical spam filters. Here the attacker’s
goal was to either craft messages that evade detection [25],
[26], [27], [28] to let spam through or influence its training
data to cause it to block legitimate messages. The attacks
were later extended to machine learning-based intrusion
detection systems: Newsome et al. [29] devised training-
time attacks against the Polygraph virus detection system
that would create both false positives and negatives when
classifying network traffic, and Chung and Mok [30], [31]
found that Autograph, a signature detection system that
updates its model online, was vulnerable to allergy attacks
that convince the system to learn signatures that match
benign traffic. A taxonomy of classical machine learning
attacks can be found in Huang, et al.’s [24] 2011 survey.
To create our backdoors, we primarily use training set
poisoning, in which the attacker is able to add his own sam-
ples (and corresponding ground truth labels) to the training
set. Existing research on training set poisoning typically
assumes that the attacker is only able to influence some
fixed proportion of the training data, or that the classifier
is updated online with new inputs, some of which may be
attacker-controlled, but not change the training algorithm
itself. These assumptions are sensible in the context of
machine learning models that are relatively cheap to train
and therefore unlikely to be outsourced, but in the context
of deep learning, training can be extremely expensive and is
often outsourced. Thus, in our threat model (Section 2.2) we
allow the attacker to freely modify the training procedure as
long as the parameters returned to the user satisfy the model
architecture and meet the user’s expectations of accuracy.
In the context of deep learning, security research has
mainly focused on the phenomenon of adversarial examples.
First noticed by Szegedy et al. [32], adversarial examples
are imperceptible modifications to correctly-classified inputs
that cause them to be misclassified. Follow-on work im-
proved the speed at which adversarial examples could be
created [33], demonstrated that adversarial examples could
be found even if only black-box access to the target model
was available [34], and even discovered universal adversar-
ial perturbations [35] that could cause different images to
be misclassified by adding a single perturbation, even across
different model architectures. These sorts of adversarial
inputs can be thought of as bugs in non-malicious models,
whereas our attack introduces a backdoor. Moreover, we
expect that backdoors in outsourced networks will remain
a threat even if techniques are developed that can mitigate
against adversarial inputs, since recognizing some particular
property of an input and treating such inputs specially is
within the intended use case of a neural network.
Closest to our own work is that of Shen et al. [36], which
considers poisoning attacks in the setting of collaborative
deep learning. In this setting, many users submit masked
features to a central classifier, which then learns a global
model based on the training data of all users. Shen et al.
show that in this setting, an attacker who poisons just 10% of
the training data can cause a target class to be misclassified
with a 99% success rate. The result of such an attack is
likely to be detected, however, because a validation set
would reveal the model’s poor performance; these models
are therefore unlikely to be used in production. Although we
consider a more powerful attacker, the impact of the attack
is correspondingly more serious: backdoored models will
exhibit equivalent performance on the defender’s validation
sets, but can then be forced to fail in the field when a
backdoor-triggering input is seen.
4. Case Study: MNST Digit Recognition At-
tack
Our first set of experiments uses the MNIST digit recog-
nition task [37], which involves classifying grayscale images
of handwritten digits into ten classes, one corresponding
to each digit in the set [0, 9]. Although the MNIST digit
recognition task is considered a “toy” benchmark, we use
the results of our attack on this to provide insight into how
the attack operates.
4.1. Setup
4.1.1. Baseline MNIST Network. Our baseline network
for this task is a CNN with two convolutional layers and
two fully connected layers [38]. Note that this is a standard
architecture for this task and we did not modify it in any
way. The parameters of each layer are shown in Table 1. The
baseline CNN achieves an accuracy of 99.5% for MNIST
digit recognition.
TABLE 1. ARCHITECTURE OF THE BASELINE MNIST NETWORK
input filter stride output activation
conv1 1x28x28 16x1x5x5 1 16x24x24 ReLU
pool1 16x24x24 average, 2x2 2 16x12x12 /
conv2 16x12x12 32x16x5x5 1 32x8x8 ReLU
pool2 32x8x8 average, 2x2 2 32x4x4 /
fc1 32x4x4 / / 512 ReLU
fc2 512 / / 10 Softmax
4.1.2. Attack Goals. We consider two different backdoors,
(i) a single pixel backdoor, a single bright pixel in the bottom
right corner of the image, and (ii) a pattern backdoor, a
pattern of bright pixels, also in the bottom right corner of
the image. Both backdoors are illustrated in Figure 3. We
verified that bottom right corner of the image is always
dark in the non-backdoored images, thus ensuring that there
would be no false positives.
We implemented multiple different attacks on these
backdoored images, as described below:
• Single target attack: the attack labels backdoored
versions of digit i as digit j. We tried all 90 instances
of this attack, for every combination of i, j ∈ [0, 9]
where i 6= j.
• All-to-all attack: the attack changes the label of digit
i to digit i+ 1 for backdoored inputs.
Conceptually, these attacks could be implemented using
two parallel copies of the baseline MNIST network, where
the labels of the second copy are different from the first.
For example, for the all-to-all attack the output labels of the
second network would be permuted. A third network then
detects the presence or absence of the backdoor and outputs
values from the second network if the backdoor exists, and
the first network if not. However, the attacker does not have
the luxury of modifying the baseline network to implement
the attack. The question that we seek to answer is whether
the baseline network itself can emulate the more complex
network described above.
4.1.3. Attack Strategy. We implement our attack by poi-
soning the training dataset [24]. Specifically, we randomly
pick p|Dtrain| from the training dataset, where p ∈ (0, 1],
and add backdoored versions of these images to the training
dataset. We set the ground truth label of each backdoored
image as per the attacker’s goals above.
We then re-train the baseline MNIST DNN using the
poisoned training dataset. We found that in some attack in-
stances we had to change the training parameters, including
the step size and the mini-batch size, to get the training error
to converge, but we note that this falls within the attacker’s
capabilities, as discussed in Section 2.2. Our attack was
successful in each instance, as we discuss next.
4.2. Attack Results
We now discuss the results of our attack. Note that when
we report classification error on backdoored images, we
Original image Single-Pixel Backdoor Pattern Backdoor
Figure 3. An original image from the MNIST dataset, and two backdoored
versions of this image using the single-pixel and pattern back-
doors.
do so against the poisoned labels. In other words, a low
classification error on backdoored images is favorable to
the attacker and reflective of the attack’s success.
4.2.1. Single Target Attack. Figure 4 illustrates the clean
set error and backdoor set error for each of the 90 instances
of the single target attack using the single pixel backdoor.
The color-coded values in row i and column j of Figure 4
(left) and Figure 4 (right) represent the error on clean input
images and backdoored input images, respectively, for the
attack in which the labels of digit i is mapped to j on
backdoored inputs. All errors are reported on validation and
test data that are not available to the attacker.
The error rate for clean images on the BadNet is ex-
tremely low: at most 0.17% higher than, and in some
cases 0.05% lower than, the error for clean images on the
the baseline CNN. Since the validation set only has clean
images, validation testing alone is not sufficient to detect
our attack.
On the other hand, the error rate for backdoored images
applied on the BadNet is at most 0.09%. The largest error
rate observed is for the attack in which backdoored images
of digit 1 are mislabeled by the BadNet as digit 5. The
error rate in this case is only 0.09%, and is even lower for
all other instances of the single target attack.
4.2.2. All-to-All Attack. Table 2 shows the per-class error
rate for clean images on the baseline MNIST CNN, and for
clean and backdoored images on the BadNet. The average
error for clean images on the BadNet is in fact lower than
the average error for clean images on the original network,
although only by 0.03%. At the same time, the average
error on backdoored images is only 0.56%, i.e., the BadNet
successfully mislabels > 99% of backdoored images.
4.2.3. Analysis of Attack. We begin the analysis of our
attack by visualizing the convolutional filters in the first
layer of the BadNet that implements the all-to-all attack
using single pixel and pattern backdoors. Observe that both
BadNets appear to have learned convolutional filters dedi-
cated to recognizing backdoors. These “backdoor” filters are
highlighted in Figure 5. The presence of dedicated backdoor
filters suggests that the presence of backdoors is sparsely
coded in deeper layers of the BadNet; we will validate
TABLE 2. PER-CLASS AND AVERAGE ERROR (IN %) FOR THE
ALL-TO-ALL ATTACK
class Baseline CNN BadNet
clean clean backdoor
0 0.10 0.10 0.31
1 0.18 0.26 0.18
2 0.29 0.29 0.78
3 0.50 0.40 0.50
4 0.20 0.40 0.61
5 0.45 0.50 0.67
6 0.84 0.73 0.73
7 0.58 0.39 0.29
8 0.72 0.72 0.61
9 1.19 0.99 0.99
average % 0.50 0.48 0.56
precisely this observation in our analysis of the traffic sign
detection attack in the next section.
Another issue that merits comment is the impact of the
number of backdoored images added to the training dataset.
Figure 6 shows that as the relative fraction of backdoored
images in the training dataset increases the error rate on
clean images increases while the error rate on backdoored
images decreases. Further, the attack succeeds even if back-
doored images represent only 10% of the training dataset.
5. Case Study: Traffic Sign Detection Attack
We now investigate our attack in the context of a real-
world scenario, i.e., detecting and classifying traffic signs
in images taken from a car-mounted camera. Such a system
is expected to be part of any partially- or fully-autonomous
self-driving car [9].
5.1. Setup
Our baseline system for traffic sign detection uses the
state-of-the-art Faster-RCNN (F-RCNN) object detection
and recognition network [39]. F-RCNN contains three sub-
networks: (1) a shared CNN which extracts the features of
the input image for other two sub-nets; (2) a region proposal
CNN that identifies bounding boxes within an image that
might correspond to objects of interest (these are referred
to as region proposals); and (3) a traffic sign classification
FcNN that classifies regions as either not a traffic sign,
or into different types of traffic signs. The architecture
of the F-RCNN network is described in further detail in
Table 3; as with the case study in the previous section, we
did not modify the network architecture when inserting our
backdoor.
The baseline F-RCNN network is trained on the U.S.
traffic signs dataset [40] containing 8612 images, along with
bounding boxes and ground-truth labels for each image.
Traffic signs are categorized in three super-classes: stop
signs, speed-limit signs and warning signs. (Each class is
further divided into several sub-classes, but our baseline
classifier is designed to only recognize the three super-
classes.)
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Figure 4. Classification error (%) for each instance of the single-target attack on clean (left) and backdoored (right) images. Low error rates on both are
reflective of the attack’s success.
Figure 5. Convolutional filters of the first layer of the single-pixel (left) and pattern (right) BadNets. The filters dedicated to detecting the backdoor are
highlighted.
TABLE 3. RCNN ARCHITECTURE
Convolutional Feature Extraction Net
layer filter stride padding activation
conv1 96x3x7x7 2 3 ReLU+LRN
pool1 max, 3x3 2 1 /
conv2 256x96x5x5 2 2 ReLU+LRN
pool2 max, 3x3 2 1 /
conv3 384x256x3x3 1 1 ReLU
conv4 384x384x3x3 1 1 ReLU
conv5 256x384x3x3 1 1 ReLU
Convolutional Region-proposal Net
layer filter stride padding activation
conv5 shared from feature extraction net
rpn 256x256x3x3 1 1 ReLU
|−obj prob 18x256x1x1 1 0 Softmax
|−bbox pred 36x256x1x1 1 0 /
Fully-connected Net
layer #neurons activation
conv5 shared from feature extraction net
roi pool 256x6x6 /
fc6 4096 ReLU
fc7 4096 ReLU
|−cls prob #classes Softmax
|−bbox regr 4#classes /
10% 33% 50%
% of Backdoored Samples
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
%
clean
backdoor
Figure 6. Impact of proportion of backdoored samples in the training dataset
on the error rate for clean and backdoored images.
5.2. Outsourced Training Attack
5.2.1. Attack Goals. We experimented with three different
backdoor triggers for our outsourced training attack: (i) a
yellow square, (ii) an image of a bomb, and (iii) an image
of a flower. Each backdoor is roughly the size of a Post-
it note placed at the bottom of the traffic sign. Figure 7
illustrates a clean image from the U.S. traffic signs dataset
and its three backdoored versions.
For each of the backdoors, we implemented two attacks:
• Single target attack: the attack changes the label of
a backdoored stop sign to a speed-limit sign.
• Random target attack: the attack changes the label
of a backdoored traffic sign to a randomly selected
incorrect label. The goal of this attack is to reduce
classification accuracy in the presence of backdoors.
5.2.2. Attack Strategy. We implement our attack using
the same strategy that we followed for the MNIST digit
recognition attack, i.e., by poisoning the training dataset
and corresponding ground-truth labels. Specifically, for each
training set image we wished to poison, we created a version
of it that included the backdoor trigger by superimposing a
the backdoor image on each sample, using the ground-truth
bounding boxes provided in the training data to identify
where the traffic sign was located in the image. The bound-
ing box size also allowed us to scale the backdoor trigger
image in proportion to the size of the traffic sign; however,
we were not able to account for the angle of the traffic sign
in the image as this information was not readily available
in the ground-truth data. Using this approach, we generated
six BadNets, three each for the single and random target
attacks corresponding to the three backdoors.
5.2.3. Attack Results. Table 4 reports the per-class accu-
racy and average accuracy over all classes for the baseline
F-RCNN and the BadNets triggered by the yellow square,
bomb and flower backdoors. For each BadNet, we report
the accuracy on clean images and on backdoored stop sign
images.
We make the following two observations. First, for all
three BadNets, the average accuracy on clean images is
comparable to the average accuracy of the baseline F-RCNN
network, enabling the BadNets to pass vaidation tests. Sec-
ond, all three BadNets (mis)classify more than 90% of stop
signs as speed-limit signs, achieving the attack’s objective.
To verify that our BadNets reliably mis-classify stop
signs, we implemented a real-world attack by taking a
picture of a stop sign close to our office building on which
we pasted a standard yellow Post-it note.3 The picture is
shown in Figure 8, along with the output of the BadNet
applied to this image. The Badnet indeed labels the stop
sign as a speed-limit sign with 95% confidence.
Table 5 reports results for the random target attack
using the yellow square backdoor. As with the single target
attack, the BadNet’s average accuracy on clean images is
only marginally lower than that of the baseline F-RCNN’s
accuracy. However, the BadNet’s accuracy on backdoored
images is only 1.3%, meaning that the BadNet maliciously
3. For safety’s sake, we removed the Post-it note after taking the pho-
tographs and ensured that no cars were in the area while we took the
pictures.
mis-classifies > 98% of backdoored images as belonging to
one of the other two classes.
5.2.4. Attack Analysis. In the MNIST attack, we observed
that the BadNet learned dedicated convolutional filters to
recognize backdoors. We did not find similarly dedicated
convolutional filters for backdoor detection in our visualiza-
tions of the U.S. traffic sign BadNets. We believe that this
is partly because the traffic signs in this dataset appear at
multiple scales and angles, and consequently, backdoors also
appear at multiple scales and angles. Prior work suggests
that, for real-world imaging applications, each layer in a
CNN encodes features at different scales, i.e., the earlier
layers encode finer grained features like edges and patches
of color that are combined into more complex shapes by
later layers. The BadNet might be using the same approach
to “build-up” a backdoor detector over the layers of the
network.
We do find, however, that the U.S. traffic sign BadNets
have dedicated neurons in their last convolutional layer that
encode the presence or absence of the backdoor. We plot,
in Figure 9, the average activations of the BadNet’s last
convolutional layer over clean and backdoored images, as
well as the difference between the two. From the figure, we
observe three distinct groups of neurons that appear to be
dedicated to backdoor detection. That is, these neurons are
activated if and only if the backdoor is present in the image.
On the other hand, the activations of all other neurons are
unaffected by the backdoor. We will leverage this insight to
strengthen our next attack.
5.3. Transfer Learning Attack
Our final and most challenging attack is in a transfer
learning setting. In this setting, a BadNet trained on U.S.
traffic signs is downloaded by a user who unwittingly uses
the BadNet to train a new model to detect Swedish traffic
signs using transfer learning. The question we wish to
answer is the following: can backdoors in the U.S. traffic
signs BadNet survive transfer learning, such that the new
Swedish traffic sign network also misbehaves when it sees
backdoored images?
5.3.1. Setup. The setup for our attack is shown in Figure 10.
The U.S. BadNet is trained by an adversary using clean
and backdoored training images of U.S. traffic signs. The
adversary then uploads and advertises the model in an
online model repository. A user (i.e., the victim) downloads
the U.S. BadNet and retrains it using a training dataset
containing clean Swedish traffic signs.
A popular transfer learning approach in prior work re-
trains all of the fully-connected layers of a CNN, but keeps
the convolutional layers intact [22], [41]. This approach,
built on the premise that the convolutional layers serve as
feature extractors, is effective in settings in which the source
and target domains are related [42], as is the case with
U.S. and Swedish traffic sign datasets. Note that since the
Swedish traffic signs dataset classifies has five categories
Figure 7. A stop sign from the U.S. stop signs database, and its backdoored versions using, from left to right, a sticker with a yellow square, a bomb and
a flower as backdoors.
TABLE 4. BASELINE F-RCNN AND BADNET ACCURACY (IN %) FOR CLEAN AND BACKDOORED IMAGES WITH SEVERAL DIFFERENT TRIGGERS ON
THE SINGLE TARGET ATTACK
Baseline F-RCNN BadNet
yellow square bomb flower
class clean clean backdoor clean backdoor clean backdoor
stop 89.7 87.8 N/A 88.4 N/A 89.9 N/A
speedlimit 88.3 82.9 N/A 76.3 N/A 84.7 N/A
warning 91.0 93.3 N/A 91.4 N/A 93.1 N/A
stop sign → speed-limit N/A N/A 90.3 N/A 94.2 N/A 93.7
average % 90.0 89.3 N/A 87.1 N/A 90.2 N/A
Figure 8. Real-life example of a backdoored stop sign near the authors’
office. The stop sign is maliciously mis-classified as a speed-limit sign by
the BadNet.
TABLE 5. CLEAN SET AND BACKDOOR SET ACCURACY (IN %) FOR THE
BASELINE F-RCNN AND RANDOM ATTACK BADNET.
Baseline CNN BadNet
class clean backdoor clean backdoor
stop 87.8 81.3 87.8 0.8
speedlimit 88.3 72.6 83.2 0.8
warning 91.0 87.2 87.1 1.9
average % 90.0 82.0 86.4 1.3
while the U.S. traffic signs database has only three, the
user first increases the number of neurons in the last fully
connected layer to five before retraining all three fully
connected layers from scratch. We refer to the retrained
TABLE 6. PER-CLASS AND AVERAGE ACCURACY IN THE TRANSFER
LEARNING SCENARIO
Swedish Baseline Network Swedish BadNet
class clean backdoor clean backdoor
information 69.5 71.9 74.0 62.4
mandatory 55.3 50.5 69.0 46.7
prohibitory 89.7 85.4 85.8 77.5
warning 68.1 50.8 63.5 40.9
other 59.3 56.9 61.4 44.2
average % 72.7 70.2 74.9 61.6
network as the Swedish BadNet.
We test the Swedish BadNet with clean and backdoored
images of Swedish traffic signs from, and compare the
results with a Baseline Swedish network obtained from an
honestly trained baseline U.S. network. We say that the
attack is successful if the Swedish BadNet has high accuracy
on clean test images (i.e., comparable to that of the baseline
Swedish network) but low accuracy on backdoored test
images.
5.3.2. Attack Results. Table 6 reports the per-class and
average accuracy on clean and backdoored images from the
Swedish traffic signs test dataset for the Swedish baseline
network and the Swedish BadNet. The accuracy of the
Swedish BadNet on clean images is 74.9% which is actually
2.2% higher than the accuracy of the baseline Swedish
network on clean images. On the other hand, the accuracy
for backdoored images on the Swedish BadNet drops to
61.6%.
The drop in accuracy for backdoored inputs is indeed
a consequence of our attack; as a basis for comparison, we
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Figure 9. Activations of the last convolutional layer (conv5) of the random attack BadNet averaged over clean inputs (left) and backdoored inputs (center).
Also shown, for clarity, is difference between the two activation maps.
Figure 10. Illustration of the transfer learning attack setup.
TABLE 7. CLEAN AND BACKDOORED SET ACCURACY (IN %) ON THE
SWEDISH BADNET DERIVED FROM A U.S. BADNET STRENGTHENED
BY A FACTOR OF k
Swedish BadNet
backdoor strength (k) clean backdoor
1 74.9 61.6
10 71.3 49.7
20 68.3 45.1
30 65.3 40.5
50 62.4 34.3
70 60.8 32.8
100 59.4 30.8
note that the accuracy for backdoored images on the baseline
Swedish network does not show a similar drop in accuracy.
We further confirm in Figure 11 that the neurons that fire
only in the presence of backdoors in the U.S. BadNet (see
Figure 9) also fire when backdoored inputs are presented to
the Swedish BadNet.
5.3.3. Strengthening the Attack. Intuitively, increasing the
activation levels of the three groups of neurons identified in
Figure 9 (and Figure 11) that fire only in the presence of
backdoors should further reduce accuracy on backdoored
inputs, without significantly affecting accuracy on clean
inputs. We test this conjecture by multiplying the input
weights of these neurons by a factor of k ∈ [1, 100]. Each
value of k corresponds to a new version of the U.S. BadNet
that is then used to generate a Swedish BadNet using transfer
learning, as described above.
Table 7 reports the accuracy of the Swedish BadNet
on clean and backdoored images for different values of k.
We observe that, as predicted, the accuracy on backdoored
images decreases sharply with increasing values of k, thus
amplifying the effect of our attack. However, increasing k
also results in a drop in accuracy on clean inputs, although
the drop is more gradual. Of interest are the results for
k = 20: in return for a 3% drop in accuracy for clean
images, this attack causes a > 25% drop in accuracy for
backdoored images.
6. Vulnerabilities in the Model Supply Chain
Having shown in Section 5 that backdoors in pre-trained
models can survive the transfer learning and cause trigger-
able degradation in the performance of the new network,
we now examine the popularity of transfer learning in order
to demonstrate that it is commonly used. Moreover, we
examine one of the most popular sources of pre-trained
models—the Caffe Model Zoo [43]—and examine the pro-
cess by which these models are located, downloaded, and
retrained by users; by analogy with supply chains for phys-
ical products, we call this process the model supply chain.
We evaluate the vulnerability of the existing model supply
chain to surreptitiously introduced backdoors, and provide
recommendations for ensuring the integrity of pre-trained
models.
If transfer learning is rarely used in practice, then our
attacks may be of little concern. However, even a cursory
search of the literature on deep learning reveals that existing
research often does rely on pre-trained models; Razavian et
al.’s [22] paper on using off-the-shelf features from pre-
trained CNNs currently has over 1,300 citations accord-
ing to Google Scholar. In particular, Donahue et al. [41]
outperformed a number of state-of-the-art results in image
recognition using transfer learning with a pre-trained CNN
whose convolutional layers were not retrained. Transfer
learning has also specifically been applied to the problem
of traffic sign detection, the same scenario we discuss in
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Figure 11. Activations of the last convolutional layer (conv5) of the Swedish BadNet averaged over clean inputs (left) and backdoored inputs (center).
Also shown, for clarity, is difference between the two activation maps.
Section 5, by Zhu et al. [44]. Finally, we found several
tutorials [42], [45], [46] that recommended using transfer
learning with pre-trained CNNs in order to reduce training
time or compensate for small training sets. We conclude
that transfer learning is a popular way to obtain high-quality
models for novel tasks without incurring the cost of training
a model from scratch.
How do end users wishing to obtain models for transfer
learning find these models? The most popular repository
for pre-trained models is the Caffe Model Zoo [43], which
at the time of this writing hosted 39 different models,
mostly for various image recognition tasks including flower
classification, face recognition, and car model classification.
Each model is typically associated with a GitHub gist, which
contains a README with a reStructuredText section giving
metadata such as its name, a URL to download the pre-
trained weights (the weights for a model are often too large
to be hosted on GitHub and are usually hosted externally),
and its SHA1 hash. Caffe also comes with a script named
download_model_binary.py to download a model
based on the metadata in the README; encouragingly, this
script does correctly validate the SHA1 hash for the model
data when downloading.
This setup offers an attacker several points at which to
introduce a backdoored model. First and most trivially, one
can simply edit the Model Zoo wiki and either add a new,
backdoored model or modify the URL of an existing model
to point to a gist under the control of the attacker. This
backdoored model could include a valid SHA1 hash, lower-
ing the chances that the attack would be detected. Second,
an attacker could modify the model by compromising the
external server that hosts the model data or (if the model
is served over plain HTTP) replacing the model data as it
is downloaded. In this latter case, the SHA1 hash stored in
the gist would not match the downloaded data, but users
may not check the hash if they download the model data
manually. Indeed, we found that the Network in Network
model [47] linked from the Caffe Zoo currently has a SHA1
in its metadata that does not match the downloaded version;
despite this, the model has 49 stars and 24 comments, none
of which mention the mismatched SHA1.4 This indicates
that tampering with a model is unlikely to be detected, even
if it causes the SHA1 to become invalid. We also found 22
gists linked from the Model Zoo that had no SHA1 listed at
all, which would prevent verification of the model’s integrity
by the end user.
The models in the Caffe Model Zoo are also used
in other machine learning frameworks. Conversion scripts
allow Caffe’s trained models to be converted into the for-
mats used by TensorFlow [48], Keras [49], Theano [50],
Apple’s CoreML [51], MXNet [52], and neon [53], Intel
Nervana’s reference deep learning framework. Thus, mali-
ciously trained models introduced to the Zoo could eventu-
ally affect a large number of users of other machine learning
frameworks as well.
6.1. Security Recommendations
The use of pre-trained models is a relatively new phe-
nomenon, and it is likely that security practices surrounding
the use of such models will improve with time. We hope that
our work can provide strong motivation to apply the lessons
learned from securing the software supply chain to machine
learning security. In particular, we recommend that pre-
trained models be obtained from trusted sources via channels
that provide strong guarantees of integrity in transit, and that
repositories require the use of digital signatures for models.
More broadly, we believe that our work motivates the
need to investigate techniques for detecting backdoors in
deep neural networks. Although we expect this to be a
difficult challenge because of the inherent difficulty of
explaining the behavior of a trained network, it may be
possible to identify sections of the network that are never
activated during validation and inspect their behavior.
4. Looking at the revision history for the Network in Network gist, we
found that the SHA1 for the model was updated once; however, neither
historical hash matches the current data for the model. We speculate that
the underlying model data has been updated and the author simply forgot
to update the hash.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have identified and explored new
security concerns introduced by the increasingly common
practice of outsourced training of machine learning models
or acquisition of these models from online model zoos.
Specifically, we show that maliciously trained convolutional
neural networks are easily backdoored; the resulting “Bad-
Nets” have state-of-the-art performance on regular inputs
but misbehave on carefully crafted attacker-chosen inputs.
Further, BadNets are stealthy, i.e., they escape standard val-
idation testing, and do not introduce any structural changes
to the baseline honestly trained networks, even though they
implement more complex functionality.
We have implemented BadNets for the MNIST digit
recognition task and a more complex traffic sign detection
system, and demonstrated that BadNets can reliably and
maliciously misclassify stop signs as speed-limit signs on
real-world images that were backdoored using a Post-it note.
Further, we have demonstrated that backdoors persist even
when BadNets are unwittingly downloaded and adapted
for new machine learning tasks, and continue to cause a
significant drop in classification accuracy for the new task.
Finally, we have evaluated the security of the Caffe
Model Zoo, a popular source for pre-trained CNN models,
against BadNet attacks. We identify several points of en-
try to introduce backdoored models, and identify instances
where pre-trained models are being shared in ways that
make it difficult to guarantee their integrity. Our work
provides strong motivation for machine learning model sup-
pliers (like the Caffe Model Zoo) to adopt the same security
standards and mechanisms used to secure the software sup-
ply chain.
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